Readings in Public Choice Economics 1st Edition by Jac Heckelman ISBN 9780472030217 0472030213

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Product details: 

ISBN 10:   0472030213 

ISBN 13:  9780472030217

Author: Jac C. Heckelman
The first classroom book for undergraduate courses in public choice analysis, covering both political economy and social choice issuesPublic choice analysis applies the methodology of economics to issues in political science and the policy process. The readings in this anthology cover topics in both institutional political economy and social choice theory and are comprehensible to nonspecialists and advanced undergraduates with a background in basic economic theory. Readings are taken from academic journals and book chapters and are reproduced in their entirety. They are selected to ensure they contain a minimal amount of notation and are free of advanced econometrics.The anthology contains two to three readings each to explore the areas of rent seeking, collective action, bureaucracy, elections and the economy, choosing decision rules, majority rule, alternative voting procedures, and the calculus of voting. Each part contains a brief introduction to the general theme, and questions are presented as a guide to each reading. Additional suggested readings are provided to develop these concepts further.Jac C. Heckelman is Associate Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University.

Table of contents: 

I OVERVIEW

The Public Choice Revolution – Gwartney & Wagner

II INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

I Rent Seeking

Is the Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay? – Tollison

Rent Seeking and Tax Reform – Tullock

Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation – McChesney

II Collective Action

The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO – Oneal

The South Will Fall Again: The South as Leader and Laggard in Economic Growth – Olson

III Bureaucracy

Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen Model and Its Critics – Blais & Dion

The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy – Breton & Wintrobe

III ELECTIONS AND THE ECONOMY

National Elections and Policy Induced Business Cycles: A Historical Perspective on the Literature – Soh

Econometrics and Presidential Elections – Fair

Taxes and the Electoral Cycle: How Sensitive Are Governors to Coming Elections? – Case

IV SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

I Choosing Decision Rules

Individual Choice in Voting and the Market – Buchanan

Constitutional Design for a Rent-Seeking Society: Voting Rule Choice – Spindler

Social Choice and Arrow’s Paradox – MacKay

II Majority Rule

Collective Decision Rules and Local Debt Choice: A Test of the Median-Voter Hypothesis – McEachern

The Strategy of Voting – Dixit & Nalebuff

Probabilistic Majority Rule – Mueller

III Alternative Voting Procedures

An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes – Levin & Nalebuff

An Application of Social Choice Theory to U.S.D.A. Forest Service Decision Making – Martin, Shields, Tolwinski, Kent

IV The Calculus of Voting

Rational Choice and Turnout – Aldrich

The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates – Heckelman

V FINAL THOUGHTS

Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the “Nobel” Lie – Brennan & Buchanan

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Tags: Jac Heckelman, Public Choice Economics