Fixing reference 1st Edition by Imogen Dickie – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 978-0198801795, 0198801793
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ISBN 10: 0198801793
ISBN 13: 978-0198801795
Author: Imogen Dickie
Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles–one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification–combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely luck to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them–perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions–do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness.
Table of contents:
1. Introduction
1.1 The Question and Basic Components of the Answer
1.2 Preliminaries
1.2.1 Language and thought
1.2.2 Naturalism vs non-naturalism
1.2.3 Justification
1.2.4 The status of examples
1.2.5 Explanatory ambitions
1.2.6 The notion of an ordinary object and the ‘problem of the many’
2. In Which a Precise Version of the Connection Between Aboutness and Justification Is Derived From More Basic Principles
Introduction
2.1 TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION
2.2 From TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION to REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION
2.3 The Objection from Potential Counterexamples
Appendix A: Proof of the Uniqueness Lemma
Appendix B: Not About Nothing
3. The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself Introduction
3.1 Anscombe’s Distinction Between Practical and Speculative Knowledge
3.2 From Anscombian Practical Knowledge to Justification by Intention
3.3 The Need to Represent
3.4 The Need to Represent and the Normative Status of Direct Coordination
3.5 Reference, Justification, and Orders of Explanation
4. Perceptual Demonstratives
Introduction
4.1 An Empirical Component
4.2 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (I)-Structure
4.3 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (II)-Normativity Interim Conclusion
4.4 Three Puzzles about Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing
4.4.1 First puzzle: Classification
4.4.2 Second puzzle: Comprehension
4.4.3 Third puzzle: Directness
4.5 The Problem of Empty Perceptual Demonstrative Thought
4.6 Perceptual Demonstrative Thought and the Nature of Perception
5. Proper Names
Introduction
5.1 Descriptivisms vs Causalisms: The Traditional Debate
5.2 Evans on Proper Names
Interim Conclusion
5.3 Proper Names in the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION Framework
5.4 Varieties of Deference
Appendix A: Additional Intricacies
Appendix B: The Context-Dependence of Proper-Name-Based Aboutness
6. The Delicate Question of Reference by Description
Introduction
6.1 Russell
6.2 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (I)-Truth Conditions
6.3 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (II) -Justification
Conclusion
7. Descriptions and Singular Thought
Introduction
7.1 The Boundaries of Description-Based Singular Thought
7.2 Object Dependence
7.3 Comparison with Extant Proposals: Extended Acquaintance and Modified Semantic Instrumentalism
7.3.1 Extended acquaintance
7.3.2 Modified semantic instrumentalism
8. Thought and Consciousness
Introduction
8.1 Naturalism in the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION Framework
8.2 Putting Consciousness Back In
8.3 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (I)-The Role of Motivational Phenomenology
Interim Conclusion
8.4 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (II)-Thought Without Perceptual Awareness?
8.4.1 The question of role
8.4.2 The question of essence
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