Belief about the Self A Defense of the Property Theory of Content 1st Edition by Neil Feit ISBN 978-0195341362 0195341368
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Product details:
ISBN 10: 0195341368
ISBN 13: 978-0195341362
Author: Neil Feit
Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in general, the contents of our beliefs are properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person.
Belief about the Self offers a sustained defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with an array of new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.
Table of contents:
Chapter I
Mental Content and the Problem of De Se Belief
1. Cognitive Attitudes and Content
2. The Doctrine of Propositions
3. The Problem of De Se Belief
4. The Property Theory of Content
Chapter 2
In Favor of the Property Theory
1. Perry’s Messy Shopper and the Argument from Explanation
2. Lewis’s Case of the Two Gods
3. Arguments from Internalism and Physicalism
4. An Inference to the Best Explanation
Chapter 3
Alternatives to the Property Theory
1. The Triadic View of Belief
2. How the Property Theory and the Triadic View Are Rivals
3. Dyadic Propositionalism Reconsidered
Chapter 4
Arguments against the Property Theory
1. Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness
2. Nonexistence and Impossible Contents
3. Stalnaker’s Argument
4. Propositionalist Arguments from Inference
Chapter 5
The Property Theory and De Re Belief
1. Lewis’s Account of De Re Belief
2. McKay’s Objection to Lewis
3. Mistaken Identity and the Case of the Shy Secret Admirer
4. Some Other Worries and Concluding Remarks
Chapter 6
The Property Theory, Rationality, and Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief
1. Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief
2. The Puzzle Argument
3. A Solution to the Puzzle
4. Puzzles with Empty Names and Kind Terms
Chapter 7
The Property Theory, Twin Earth, and
Belief about Kinds
1. Twin Earth and Two Kinds of Internalism
2. The Twin Earth Argument
3. An Internalist Response (Stage One)
4. An Internalist Response (Stage Two)
5. Self-Ascription and Belief about Kinds
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Tags: Neil Feit, the Self, A Defense, Property Theory