Auction theory 1st Edition by Vijay Krishna ISBN 012426297X 978-0124262973

Auction theory 1st Edition by Vijay Krishna – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery: 012426297X, 978-0124262973
Full download Auction theory 1st Edition after payment

Product details: 

ISBN 10: 012426297X 

ISBN 13: 978-0124262973

Author:  Vijay Krishna

Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory.

This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects.

This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory.

*The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory

Table of contents: 

Section I: Single Object Auctions

• Private Value Auctions: A First Look

• The Revenue Equivalence Principle

• Qualifications and Extensions

• Mechanism Design

• Auctions with Interdependent Values

• The Revenue Ranking (“Linkage”) Principle

• Asymmetries and Other Complications

• Efficiency and the English Auction

• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values

• Bidding Rings

Section II: Multiple Object Auctions

• An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions

• Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values

• Some Revenue Considerations

• Sequential Sales

• Nonidentical Objects

• Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values

Section III: Appendices

• A: Continuous Distributions

• B: Stochastic Orders

• C: Order Statistics

• D: Affiliated Random Variables

• E: Some Linear Algebra

• F: Games of Incomplete Information

• G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions

People also search for:

putting auction theory to work
    
krishna auction theory
    
price auction theory
    
auction theory trading
    
paul milgrom auction theory

Tags: Vijay Krishna, Auction theory