Content Consciousness and Perception 1st Edition by Ezio Di Nucci ISBN ‎ 978-1847187758 1847187757

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Product details: 

ISBN 10:  1847187757

ISBN 13: 978-1847187758

Author: Ezio Di Nucci
What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time – belong to the natural world, – represent the world, – give rise to our subjective experience, – and ground human knowledge? Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, “Concepts and Mental Content”, which begins with an attack by Hans-Johann Glock on the representational theory of mind, addresses the nature of mental representation. Part II, “Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Mind”, concerns the prospects for a naturalistic metaphysics of the conscious mind. Finally, Part III, entitled “Perception”, pursues the project of giving a satisfactory philosophical account of perceptual experience. The book begins with an introductory essay by the editors, which provides an overview of the state of contemporary philosophy of mind, locating the articles to follow within that context. The individual chapters of Content, Consciousness and Perception are professional contributions to their respective areas, of interest to any philosopher of mind. The volume as a whole is ideal for non-specialists and students interested in getting to grips with the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Table of contents: 

Chapter One: Introduction

The State of Mind

Conor McHugh and Ezio DiNucci.

1 The mental and the physical

2 Content, perception and concepts.

Bibliography.

Part I: Concepts and Mental Content

Chapter Two

Concepts: Representations or Abilities?

Hans-Johann Glock

1 Are concepts representations?

2 Are concepts signified by computational/neural signs?.

3 Are concepts abilities?.

4 Concepts or concept-possession?

5 Is concept-possession a disposition or ability?

6 Is the pragmatist explanation of concept-possession circular?

7 Are concepts more finely individuated than abilities?..

Bibliography

Chapter Three

Human Philosophy: Hume on Natural Instincts and Belief Formation

Treasa Campbell

1 The traditional use of the term “natural belief”

2 Wolff’s propensity/disposition distinction.

3 Natural instincts..

4 Conclusion..

Bibliography.

Chapter Four

Can Conscious Attention Restore Uncritical Realism?

An Examination of a Neo-Russellian View of Reference Gloria Ayob………

1 Identifying Wittgenstein’s worry about the Russellian view of reference.

2 Campbell’s response: Conscious attention to an object does not require sortal classification….

3 Refining the Wittgensteinian worry about the Russellian pre-reflective view..

4 A problem for Campbell’s neo-Russellian semantics. Bibliography.

Chapter Five

On Peacocke’s Theory of Concepts

Asunción Álvarez…..

1 The theory.

2 Reference..

3 Implicit conceptions

Bibliography.

Part II: Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Mind

Chapter Six

Deflationism about Qualia

Dave Ward

1 The explanatory gap

2 The obligations of a deflationist theory.

3 Intrinsicality.

4 Ineffability.

5 Privacy..

6 Simplicity

7 Direct availability.

8 Conclusion..

Bibliography.

Chapter Seven

Heidegger and AI: Technological Metaphor and Self-Understanding

Richard Hamilton

1 Introducing the subject.

2 Reflective self-understanding.

3 Heidegger

Bibliography.

Chapter Eight

Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination

Markus E. Schlosser….

1 Non-reductive physicalism..

2 The causal exclusion argument…..

3 Events and property instantiations..

4 Conclusion.

Bibliography.

Part III: Perception.

Chapter Nine

Metaphysical Disjunctivism and the Intentional Theory of Perception

Francisco Pereira

1 Introduction

2 Considering the argument from hallucination

3 Perceptual experience and distal objects

4 Phenomenal indiscriminability.

5 Fundamental ontological asymmetry.

Bibliography.

Chapter Ten

Change Blindness and Counterfactual Dependence

Nick Jones

Bibliography.

Chapter Eleven

An Enactive Theory of Phenomenal Intentionality

Julian Kiverstein

1 What is phenomenal intentionality?

2 Against reductive representationalism.

3 Perceptual content and demonstrative thought.

4 Towards an enactive theory of phenomenal intentionality.

Bibliography..

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Tags: Ezio Di Nucci, Content Consciousness