Moral Judgment and Decision Making 1st Edition by Brian Ross, Christopher Bauman, Linda Skitka ISBN 0123744881 978-0123744883

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Product details: 

ISBN 10: 0123744881 

ISBN 13: 978-0123744883

Author: Brian H. Ross, Christopher Bauman, Linda Skitka

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology.

The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions.

Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people’s moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts.

Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters.

The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people’s reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

 

Table of contents: 

1. Causal Models: The Representational Infrastructure for Moral Judgment
Steven A. Sloman, Philip M. Fernbach, and Scott Ewing
1. Introduction
2. Causal Models
3. Architectural Considerations
4. Roles for Causal Models
5. Moral Principles That Draw on Causal Structure 6. Conclusions
References
2. Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge
John Mikhail
1. The Moral Grammar Hypothesis
2. The Problem of Descriptive Adequacy
3. Intuitive Legal Appraisal
4. Deontic Rules
5. A Periodic Table of Moral Elements 6. Conversion Rules
7. Conclusion
Acknowledgments References

3. Law, Psychology, and Morality Kenworthey Bilz and Janice Nadler
1. Introduction
2. How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Cognitions? 3. How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Behaviors? 4. The Effect of Law on Moral Expression
5. Conclusion Acknowledgments References
4. Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgment
Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov
1. Introduction
2. Protected Values
3. Relation of PVs to Other Types of Judgment
4. Omission Bias
5. Relation of Omission Bias to Other Biases

6. Study 1: Relation of PVS to Omission Bias 7. Study 2: Relation to Emotion
8. Study 3: The Nature of Omission Bias 9. Conclusion
Acknowledgments References
5. Attending to Moral Values
Rumen Iliev, Sonya Sachdeva, Daniel M. Bartels, Craig Joseph, Satoru Suzuki, and Douglas L. Medin
1. Introduction
2. Moral Values in the Laboratory
3. A Cognitive Perspective on Sacred Values
4. Attentional Influences and the Acceptability of Trade-Offs 5. General Discussion
References
6. Noninstrumental Reasoning over Sacred Values: An Indonesian Case Study
Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran
1. Introduction
2. Testing the “Backfire Effect” in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
3. Sequential Offers in Negotiations over Sacred Values
4. Retesting the Backfire Effect in a Study of Indonesian
Madrassah Students
5. General Discussion
References

7. Development and Dual Processes in Moral Reasoning: A Fuzzy-trace Theory Approach
Valerie F. Reyna and Wanda Casillas
1. Overview
2. An Introduction to Fuzzy-trace Theory
3. Building Blocks of Moral Reasoning
4. Explaining Reversals and Paradoxes in Moral Reasoning 5. Moral Values and Risky Decisions in Adolescence
6. Conclusions
References
8. Moral Identity, Moral Functioning, and the Development of Moral Character
Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley
1. Introduction
2. Moral Self-Identity
3. Development of Moral Self-Identity
4. Schemas and Moral Information Processing
5. Moral Development as Ethical Expertise Development 6. New Directions: Neuroscience and Moral Personality 7. Conclusions
References
9. “Fools Rush In”: A JDM Perspective on the Role of Emotions in Decisions, Moral and Otherwise
Terry Connolly and David Hardman
1. Introduction
2. The Emergence of Emotion Research in JDM 3. Feelings and Emotions in Moral Decisions
10. Motivated Moral Reasoning
Peter H. Ditto, David A. Pizarro, and David Tannenbaum
1. Introduction
2. Motivated Reasoning
3. Motivated Moral Reasoning
4. Motivated Assessments of Moral Accountability 5. Motivated Use of Moral Principles
6. Motivated Moral Reasoning and Views of the Moral Thinker References
11. In the Mind of the Perceiver: Psychological Implications of Moral Conviction
Christopher W. Bauman and Linda J. Skitka
1. Introduction

2. What Is Moral Conviction?
3. How Does Research on Moral Conviction and Moral Judgment Differ? 4. The Consequences of Moral Conviction on Choice and Action
5. Implications
References

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